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ABSTRACT:  The role of emotion modeling in the development of computerized agents has long been unclear.  This is 
partially due to instability in the philosophical issues of the problem as psychologists struggle to build models for their 
own purposes, and partially due to the often-wide gap between these theories and that which can be implemented by an 
agent author.  This paper describes an effort to use emotion models in part as a deep model of utility for use in decision 
theoretic agents.  This allows for the creation of simulated forces capable of balancing a great deal of competing goals, 
and in doing so they behave, for better or for worse, in a more realistic manner. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Our broad research goal is concerned with demonstrating 
how existing human behavior modeling frameworks can 
be effectively synthesized and deployed in agent decision 
processing [1].  A particularly important goal is to 
illustrate how these models help systematically capturing 
and portraying individual differences in socially intelligent 
agents.  For example, how can agents be created to 
systematically reflect contextually relevant emotions and 
personality, and further, how do these affect their decision 
making behavior. 
 
Within the military training domain, these research issues 
manifest themselves as the desire to be able to dial up 
different opponent groups against which to train, e.g. the 
Iraqi Republican Guard, the Hamas-style suicide bomber, 
or the clandestine minions of Bin Laden. 
 
The idea that humans are rational actors whose decisions 
are often clouded by emotion is as old as Western thought.  
Until recently, artificial intelligence research concentrated 
primarily on the “rational” aspect of this, reasoning that 
since the problem of making good decisions is so difficult 
in itself that to introduce emotion into the equation would 
make the performance of the agent even worse.  Recent 
theories e.g. [1, 2, 5], however, suggest a quite different 
relationship:  that emotions are a vital part of the decision-
making process that manage the influence of a great deal  
 
 
of competing motivations.  According to these theories, 
integrating emotion models into our agents will yield not 
only better decision-makers, but also more realistic 
behavior by providing a deep model of utility.  These 
agents will delicately balance, for example, threat 
elimination versus self-preservation, in much the same 
way it is believed that people do. 
 
To begin to model this computationally, it is first 
necessary to model how emotions come about.  A variety 
of tools are available from the psychology literature, 
particularly a class of models known as cognitive 
appraisal theories.  These include the models of Lazarus 
[5], Roseman [9], and Ortony, Clore, and Collins (OCC) 
[7], and take as input a set of things that the agent is 
concerned about and how they were effected recently, and 
determine which emotions result.  For example, the OCC 
model separates concerns into goals (desired states of the 
world), standards (ideas about how people should act) and 
preferences (likes and dislikes).  These are evaluated 
against the current state of the world, and some mixture of 
twenty-two emotions results.  A key idea of these theories 
is that emotions are intrinsically valenced – they can be 
identified as being desirable or undesirable.  This implies 
a relationship with the utility functions that drive decision 
theory. 
 
Table 3.1:  Intensity factors for goals 
 
This output can be made useful to such decision theory 
algorithms by creating a utility function that combines 
these emotions and their intensities into a single number 
representing the desirability of a course of action.  The 
details of this are personality-dependent, as, for example, 
some individuals are extremely shame averse, and will 
avoid courses of action that lead to significant goal 
successes if they believe them to be morally reprehensible.  
Given such a utility function, various decision-making 
strategies then become applicable:  score maximization, 
game theory, least regret, etc. 
 
This paper describes a partially implemented system 
representing these ideas, using the OCC model to generate  
emotions.  The scenario involves the planning of a 
terrorist bombing mission.  The emotional outcomes of 
terrorist missions are particularly important to consider, as 
rarely are such attacks designed with force on force 
attrition in mind – it is precisely the emotional impact on 
the enemy and the general populace that makes the 
mission worth doing.   
 
2. The OCC Model 
 
As mentioned previously, the OCC model divides the 
concerns of an agent into goals, standards, and 
preferences.   
 
2.1 Goals 
 
Goals can take one of three forms: 1) active goals, which 
the agent can directly plan to make happen (I want to 
reload my rifle); 2) interest goals, which are states of the 
world that the agent would like to become reality but 
generally has no say in (I want important missions); and 3) 
replenishment goals, which periodically spawn active 
goals based on time since last fulfillment (I do not want to 
starve).   
 
2.1.1  Active goals 
Active goals are those states of the world that an agent is 
currently engaged in and attempts to bring about through 
direct manipulation of the environment.  These typically 
manifest as the individual steps of a plan, and can be 
tightly integrated with a planner as demonstrated by 
Gratch [4].  An active goal succeeds when its post-
conditions evaluate to true, and fails when the negations of 
its preconditions are confirmed to be true.  The importance 
of an active goal can be modeled as inversely proportional 
to the number of acceptable alternative means of 
accomplishing the same step in the plan. 
 
2.1.2  Interest goals 
Interest goals differ slightly in that in general agents 
cannot take direct action to accomplish them.  These 
become particularly important in game theoretic decision 
making, as an important interest goal of one agent may be 
entirely thwartable by the actions of an opponent.   
 
It is not clear exactly how interest goals come to be held 
by an agent, and for this reason they are implemented as 
static parts of an agent’s goal hierarchy with importance 
values set by the agent author.  While this does 
oversimplify their role, there is likely a complex social 
and psychological process involved in the creation and 
maintenance of interest goals, and doing justice to this is 
beyond the scope of this current article. 
 
In order to determine the intensities of emotions pertaining 
to the success or failure of goals, the OCC model uses 
several variables depending upon the context of the 
situation.  Specifically, the variables used depend on 
whether the event is confirmed, disconfirmed, or 
unconfirmed, whether the event was anticipated, and 
whether it happened to the agent itself or someone else.  
Table 3.1 shows the intensity variables associated with 
each permutation of these variables.  
 
Unfortunately, it is far from clear how some of these can 
be computed.  For this reason, the system as implemented 
to date tracks only the importance, probability, and 
temporal proximity of goals.  The variables pertaining to 
how one agent feels about another are considered 
relationship parameters, and will be discussed later.  
Degree deserved, effort expended, and degree of 
realization are left for future research. 
 
2.1.3  Replenishment goals 
Replenishment goals are essentially recurring active goals 
whose success or failure is a function of how long it has 
been since they were last fulfilled.  As implemented, for 
some time after fulfillment they are considered to have 
succeeded.  After this time they are considered unaffected 
Confirmation Anticipated? Effected 
Agent 
Intensity Variables 
(Dis)Confirmed No Self Importance 
(Dis)Confirmed Yes Self Importance, previous probability, effort expended, degree realized 
Unconfirmed Yes Self Importance, probability 
(Dis)Confirmed No Other Importance to other, importance to self, extent deserved, extent 
(dis)liked 
until, when a goal-specific amount of time has elapsed, 
they are considered to be failing. 
 
2.1.4  Goal-based emotions 
Under the OCC model, unanticipated confirmed goal 
successes and failures for one’s self generate joy and 
distress, where anticipated goal effects in an unconfirmed 
state generate hope and fear.  In a confirmed state, hope 
and fear will turn to satisfaction or disappointment, 
respectively, and in the disconfirmed state fear and hope 
become relief and, for lack of a better term, fears-
confirmed.  When evaluating how the goals of others have 
been effected, goal successes will generate happy-for or 
resentment, and goal failures will generate gloating or 
pity, depending on whether the agent in question is liked 
or disliked by the agent experiencing the emotion. 
 
2.2 Standards 
 
Standards are not unlike interest goals in that they are 
passive in nature.  However, since they represent how 
people should behave, they are triggered not only when 
something relevant happens to the agent, but when 
something relevant happens to anyone.  We are affected 
by reading accounts of ancient warfare practices not 
because these still can threaten us (or anyone we care 
about) in any tangible way, but because they often differ 
so greatly from what we consider acceptable.   
 
2.2.1  Standards-based emotions 
Standards are responsible for what the OCC model terms 
“attribution emotions”.   When responsibility for an action 
is attributed to one’s self, pride or shame will result.  
When attributed to an external agent, these turn to 
admiration or reproach. 
 
The intensities of standards-based emotions are effected 
by three primary factors.  The degree of judged 
praiseworthiness or blameworthiness is the first, and is 
implemented as the result of the significance function for 
an effected standard.   
 
The strength of the cognitive unit between the emoting 
agent and the agent performing the action determines the 
degree to which one will feel, for instance, shame as 
opposed to reproach for the blameworthy actions of 
another person.  It is often the case that one will indeed 
feel a self-focused emotion about, for instance, the actions 
of one’s country, even though that individual strictly had 
nothing to do with that particular action.   
 
The third intensity factor involves deviations from role-
based expectations.  This captures the idea that we 
generally do not develop intense feelings about things we 
expect of people.  As there is not yet a system in place for 
managing roles and the development of beliefs about 
another agent’s concern structures, this intensity factor is 
not is not yet implemented. 
 
2.3 Preferences 
 
Lastly, preferences track the likes and dislikes of an agent.  
While typically pertaining to objects (I dislike broccoli), it 
is important particularly in military scenarios to note that 
it is entirely possible to view another agent as an object. 
This has the side effect of making them not subject to 
standards, and consequently an agent will not feel 
standards-based emotions about anything done to the 
objectified agent.  This includes, for example, the shame 
normally felt for inflicting needless harm on another 
person.  
 
2.3.1  Preference-based emotions 
Emotions resulting from effects upon preferences come 
only in two varieties under the OCC model:  liking and 
disliking. 
 
Preference-based emotions have only two intensity 
factors.  The degree to which an object is considered 
appealing or unappealing is modeled again using the 
significance function.  As advertisers are well aware, 
familiarity with an object breeds a tendency to express a 
preference for it, and as the second intensity factor, this 
amplifies the intensity of liking and dampens the intensity 
of disliking. 
 
2.4 Representation of Goals, Standards, and 
Preferences 
 
In this implementation, goals, standards, and preferences, 
collectively referred to here as concerns, are arranged 
hierarchically, with parent nodes being that which 
motivates their children.  A goal to write a paper may have 
as children finding a topic, doing research, opening a word 
processor, and typing.  Each concern contains a fulfillment 
condition and a thwarting condition, indicating when it 
has been satisfied and when it has become impossible, and 
two importance values indicating the degree to which its 
success or failure directly causes the success or failure of 
its parent.  Importance values range from 0 to 1, with 1 
indicating that if the child succeeds/fails the parent 
succeeds/fails totally, and 0 indicating that the 
success/failure of the child is irrelevant to the parent.  In 
this example, finding a topic is critical to writing the 
paper, giving it a failure importance of 1.0, but finding a 
topic is only a small part of finishing the entire paper, 
giving it a substantially smaller success importance.  
Figure 2.1 shows this graphically.  The number before the 
slash is the success importance, and the number after the 
slash is the failure importance. 
 
Figure 2.1:  Hierarchical goal structure 
 
Fulfillment and thwarting conditions are expressed using 
predicate logic with functions and relations defined in 
arbitrary Python code that draws upon the agent's 
knowledge of the world.  Each logical statement is 
quantified over two variables indicating who is the agent 
performing the action and who is the direct object of this 
action.   If a particular goal has been effected, a list of time 
intervals when the statement is believed to be true is 
returned along with confidence values (interpreted as 
probabilities) and variable bindings. Consequently, four 
pieces of information are conveyed to the agent:  1) 
whether this concern has been effected in the past or may 
be effected in the future, 2) how confident the agent is that 
this is the case, 3) who is responsible for this occurring, 
and 4) who was affected by this event.  The structure of 
this information closely resembles that which is conveyed 
in the construal frames of Elliot [2]. 
 
As currently implemented, the functions used by these 
predicates are simple table lookups with values set by the 
scenario designer.  When attached to a more complete 
agent model, however, they will draw upon the current 
beliefs of the agent.  A number of important issues are 
hidden here, particularly credit/blame assignment and 
determining the probability and temporal proximity of 
future events. 
 
2.5 Relationships 
 
One of the most important functions of emotions is to 
regulate our behavior in social situations.  As such, agents 
must represent not only their own concerns, but also those 
of the other agents they know.  The OCC model uses four 
parameters involving how agents feel about one another, 
again dependent upon the type of emotion being 
generated.  For each pair of agents (X, Y), the following 
are defined by the model:  1) the degree to which X likes 
Y; 2) the degree to which X dislikes Y; 3) the degree to 
which X has formed a cognitive unit with Y; and 4) the 
degree to which X is familiar with Y.  Two additional 
parameters were added for implementation purposes, to be 
used in determining the intensities of standards-based and 
preference-based emotions, respectively:  1) the degree to 
which X views Y as an agent; 2) the degree to which X 
views Y as an object. 
 
2.6 Calculating Intensities 
 
At each event, all agents evaluate their goals, standards, 
and preferences, as well as those of the other agents they 
know.  A success or failure is given a significance value 
by multiplying importance values up the hierarchy.  The 
significance of a concern c is determined by the equation: 
 
Equation 2.1 
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where o is the outcome for a concern c (either success or 
failure), so(c) is the significance of c for outcome o, Io (c1, 
c2) is the importance under o of c1 to c2, and p(c) is the 
parent of c. 
 
This significance value is then used in an emotion-specific 
equation along with other intensity factors discussed 
previously to determine the intensity of a specific 
emotion.  These equations are given in Appendix A. 
 
3. Linking Emotion to Utility 
 
Appraisal models are consistent in their reliance upon a set 
of agent concerns, but for the most part give no advice 
about how to determine what these concerns might be for 
a fully developed agent.  At the highest level, the works of 
Maslow [5] are relevant, pointing out five basic motives 
from which all others are derived:  1) physiological needs; 
2) safety needs; 3) social belonging; 4) personal esteem; 
and 5) self-actualization needs.  Though we reject his 
seriality premise, Maslow’s work has been empirically 
shown to be descriptive of individuals across cultures, age 
groups, and generations, and is consequently a rich source 
of high-level goals, standards, and preferences. 
 
In terms of creating reusable models of emotive agents, 
what is needed is a rich hierarchy of goals, standards and 
preferences for each type of agent. A good example of 
such a rich hierarchy for terrorists may be found in 
Weaver & Silverman [10]. That work shows a hierarchy 
of cases that differs across terrorists who come from 
different organizations. Further it shows how to devise 
hierarchies for new groups as a function of their political 
setting, ideology, campaign & mission aims, operational 
objectives, and so on. 
 
At still lower levels, concerns vary widely among 
individuals.  To develop a complete model of what an 
agent cares about, we must probe deeper into who we are 
modeling.  Upbringing, personal history, and individual 
quirks can all significantly effect what goals, standards, 
and preferences an agent is likely to hold.  Two terrorists 
even from the same group will tend to have differences in 
their care, as will any two soldiers. However, we may not 
care to model such fine-gained differences. Also, several 
effects in clandestine terrorist cells tend to drive them to 
be consensual (e.g., being isolated from others and 
needing to belong to the cell, as well as the well known 
“risky shift” effect). 
 
Finally, it should be noted that when describing a group of 
people after extensive study, the language used by authors 
often directly translates into a description of their common 
goals, standards, and preferences, and how they differ 
from other groups.  From this we hope to derive a reusable 
database of archetypes, from which we can provide agent 
authors a template to use in instantiating members of an 
organization. 
 
Even given such a system, we must account for the effects 
of one more dimension of individual differences.  Despite 
similar emotional outcomes, different people will often 
still choose different alternatives: some are pleasure 
seekers, some are tremendously averse to distress, and still 
others will endure great pain as their goals fail in order to 
uphold their standards.  We have chosen to represent this 
observation by taking into account the “Big 5” personality 
traits [7]. 
 
According to this taxonomy, the personality of an 
individual can be parameterized into five dimensions:  
surgency, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional 
stability, and openness to new experiences.  Each of these 
dimensions is implemented as scored from 0 to 1, and acts 
as a weight upon certain emotions when combining into 
utility. 
 
The term surgency refers to the degree to which agents are 
proactive in achieving their goals.  Individuals strongly 
exhibiting this trait consider advancement of their own 
goals to be of paramount importance, potentially at the 
expense of failing standards and preferences, or negative 
emotional outcomes for others.  A surgent individual will 
not think twice given an opportunity to wade through raw 
sewage for a chance to surprise an unprepared enemy.  As 
implemented, this trait weights the importance of and joy, 
satisfaction, relief, and liking. 
 
The second factor in the taxonomy is agreeableness.  
Agreeable individuals are strongly concerned about the 
goals of others, and will often suppress their own to see 
them satisfied.  An agent dominated by this trait will often 
betray his instincts to follow orders.  This trait weights the 
contribution to utility of gloating, pity, happy-for, and 
resentment. 
 
Conscientiousness is the third trait of the Big 5, and 
measures the degree to which agents consider the full 
ramifications of their actions before taking them.  Those 
strongly exhibiting this trait avoid courses of actions 
leading to negative consequences, even if accompanied by 
substantial positive ones.  Such agents are unlikely to 
choose courses of action considered dishonorable, or 
risky, often at the expense of opportunities to achieve goal 
successes.  This trait is used as a weight for distress, fears-
confirmed, disappointment, disliking, pride, shame, 
admiration, and reproach. 
 
The fourth factor is Emotional Stability, which, for 
decision-making purposes, governs the degree to which an 
agent is willing to endure pain along the path to goal 
achievement.  An emotionally stable person, despite moral 
and other objections to a course of action, may still choose 
it if under the impression that it will have a significantly 
positive effect on things later on.  This term weights the 
importance of immediate gratification by recursively 
adding the utilities of an imagined successor states. 
 
Openness to Experience captures the observation that 
occasionally agents will choose an emotionally-neutral, 
not previously explored course of action over one proven 
to provide some degree of gratification.  This is 
accomplished by having this parameter act as a negative 
weight upon the most intense emotion generated by a 
course of action. 
 
Given a full model of the concerns of an agent, an emotion 
model that combines these with events to create feelings,  
and these five personality factors, we must still combine 
these into a single number in order to utilize the wealth of 
pre-existing decision theory algorithms in existence.  We 
use the following equation to convert emotion intensities 
to utility using personality: 
 
Equation 3.1 
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where U(c) is the utility of course of action c; Ps, Pa, Pc, 
Pe, and Pm are the personality dimensions surgency, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness to experience, 
and emotional stability, respectively; and Ex is the 
maximum intensity of emotion x (Ix) over all possible 
concern effects times the perceived probability of this 
outcome actually occurring. 
 
As currently implemented and in the following example, 
the system only determines courses of action one step 
ahead, and consequently the emotional stability term has 
no effect. 
 
3.3 Example Scenario 
 
To illustrate the processes described above, consider the 
problem of mission planning and executing from the point 
of three different terrorists, all of whom share a common 
enemy.  Terrorists A and B also share a common set of 
goals, motivated by a religious conflict of interests with 
their enemy.  However, Terrorist B believes passionately 
that sacred landmarks, even those of conflicting religions, 
should not be desecrated, where Terrorist A holds no such 
standard.  Terrorist C, while sharing many basic goals 
with A and B, has been driven to commit an act of 
terrorism based on a difference in political ideologies 
rather than religion.  Specifically, Terrorist C is a 
communist striking against a capitalist regime. 
 
Weaver, Silverman, et al.[10], present a framework for 
semi-automatically generating the utility structure of the 
terrorist groups, such as A, B, and C. This utility structure 
emphasizes the importance of missions to the campaign, 
targets to missions, and operational details, and how all 
this effects the population. It is particularly important for 
terrorists to carefully consider how their actions will effect 
their relationship with the surrounding population.  
Additionally, an action means nothing if the enemy is 
unaffected.  Therefore, each terrorist is concerned about 
the potential outcomes for himself, his enemy, and an 
aggregate agent representing the general populace.   
Specifically, each terrorist holds a goal that succeeds when 
(and to the extent that) the populace is positively affected, 
and fails when the populace is negatively affected.  Since 
this conflict is essentially a zero-sum game between the 
terrorist and his enemy, game theory is used to model the 
decision-making process. That is, the Weaver, Silverman, 
et al. framework is meant to be used offline to generalize 
structural differences between groups (and individual 
agents). Here we explain a dynamic framework for using 
their need structures to process emotions and personality 
differences. 
 
To simplify the example, we will assume for now that all 
three terrorists share the same scores for each personality 
trait.  Let Ps=Pa=Pc=Pe=Pm=0.5. 
 
Consider the target selection process.  The three terrorists 
are aware of five potential targets:  a bank, a sports arena, 
a religious landmark, a government building, and a 
military outpost.  The relevant goals and standards of 
Terrorist A are shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.   
 
Figure 3.1:  Goals for Terrorist A 
 
 
Figure 3.2:  Standards for Terrorist A 
 
To select a target, Terrorist A will first examine the utility 
to himself of attacking each, beginning with the bank.  On 
the positive side, as a high-profile, highly secured target, a 
successful mission against it will gain significant publicity 
for the organization in addition to having an impact on the 
financial infrastructure of the current regime.  
Furthermore, Terrorist A has no moral objection to this 
course of action, and will indeed feel some pride upon 
successfully striking this target since he has taken action 
to end an undesirable situation.  However, due to its high 
security, his goal to avoid getting caught, and in turn the 
security of the entire organization is threatened.   
 
To determine whether popular opinion will be positively 
or negatively effected, it is necessary to evaluate the 
emotional outcome of this situation for what the terrorist 
believes to be the concerns of the general populace.  The 
goals and standards of these are shown in Figures 3.3 and 
3.4, respectively.  In this case, a mixture of joy, reproach, 
admiration, and distress results, causing the goal to sway 
popular opinion to be threatened. Consequently, as a target 
the bank has the potential to create high levels of joy 
(attrition and publicity), distress (getting caught and losing 
crowd support), and lower levels of pride.  Given equal 
weightings from personality factors, these are combined 
via equation 8.1 to produce a utility of x.  A partial 
calculation, showing the contribution made to utility by 
the potential event-based emotions generated by attacking 
a secure target, is shown in Table 3.1.   
 
Emotion Intensity Prob. Partial U 
Distress 0.6 0.9 -0.54 
Joy 0.1 0.1 0.01 
Table 3.1 
 
Thus the high probability of the failure of this goal will 
cause a substantial (-0.53) lowering of the utility of this 
alternative in all but the least conscientious of agents. 
 
 
Figure 3.3:  Terrorist’s View of Populace’s Goals 
 
 
Figure 3.4:  Terrorist’s View of Populace’s Standards 
 
A similar process is undergone to determine the utility of 
the other targets, as shown in Table 3.2.  Note that given 
the importance of religion to this terrorist, attacking a 
religious landmark is considered most attractive in terms 
of goal achievement.  Furthermore, unlike Terrorist B, 
Terrorist A has no standard indicating that this is 
unacceptable behavior. 
 
Since we have chosen to represent the decision-making 
process using game theory, we must also now determine 
the utility of each of the possible terrorist courses of action 
for the enemy.  A gratifying, successful attack on a target 
is not nearly as attractive if it creates an opportunity for 
the enemy to eliminate his organization entirely or turn the 
populace further against him.  Additionally, in the absence 
of an opportunity to directly achieve his goals, he may be 
able to put the enemy in a situation in which they do it for 
him.  Consider again the utility of a bank bombing, this 
time from the point of view of the regime in power, whose 
leader’s goals and standards are shown in partially in 
Figures 3.5 and 3.6. 
 
 
Target Utility to 
Terrorist 
Primary 
Contributio
ns  
Bank -0.27 Security 
threat (-), 
populace 
reaction (-) 
Arena -0.56 Populace 
reaction (-), 
publicity (+)  
Government building -0.12 Security 
threat (-) 
Religious landmark 0.32 Attrition (+), 
populace 
reaction (-) 
Military Outpost -0.12 Security 
threat (-) 
Table 3.2 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Enemy leader’s goals 
 
Figure 3.6:  Enemy leader’s standards 
 
In short, the enemy would love to see a terrorist target its 
bank.  Given the security measures in place, a number of 
goal successes are highly probable:  threat elimination, 
demonstrating the security of the populace’s interests (and 
in turn securing valuable support from them), etc.  The 
successful defense of this territory will also generate pride, 
and consequently, the utility of this course of action to the 
enemy will be extremely high, making it less attractive to 
the terrorist than originally estimated.  A similar process is 
undergone for each other target, with results shown in 
Table 3.3.  Note again that due to the importance of the 
religious institution to the populace and its lack of 
security, the utility of having this building targeted is 
extremely low to the enemy.  Given that it is already 
highly attractive to this terrorist, it should come as no 
surprise which target will be selected by Terrorist A.   
 
Target Utility 
to 
Enemy 
Primary 
Contributions  
Bank 0.65 Terrorist attrition 
(+), populace 
reaction (+), 
positive press (+) 
Arena -0.29 Shame (-), 
populace 
reaction (-) 
Government building 0.51 Terrorist attrition 
(+), pride (+), 
positive press (+) 
Religious landmark -0.48 Populace 
reaction (-), 
shame (-) 
Military Outpost 1.1 Terrorist attrition 
(+), pride (+) 
Table 3.3 
 
We now turn to the decision-making process of Terrorist 
B.  Since they have the same goals and nearly the same 
standards, the utility of all targets excepting one is 
unchanged.  However, due to his strict objection to 
destroying religious ground, even that of a religion to 
which he is violently opposed, a significant amount of 
shame would be induced by selecting this alternative, 
lowering its utility enough that Terrorist B will choose 
Terrorist A’s second choice, the sports arena. 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Terrorist B’s standards 
 
Terrorist C is motivated by substantially different 
concerns from A or B.  Since his primary motivation is 
political/economic in nature, targets involving commerce 
begin with higher importance values attached to their 
success in the goal structure.  Consequently, they generate 
a higher potential for joy.  However, as this terrorist has 
the same resources as the other two, the successful 
bombing of high security areas is still quite unlikely, and it 
is still highly undesirable to get caught.  Terrorist C then 
faces will choose the sports arena as well, citing its 
symbolic value as a center of commerce in addition to its 
vulnerability. 
 
 
4.  Conclusions and Next Steps 
 
This paper has explained a framework for integrating 
cognitive appraisal (emotion models) and personality 
theory into agent decision-making. This framework is 
based on the OCC model, but that model alone only 
generates emotional state. It is unable to provide agent 
decision guidance. This paper’s contribution is to provide 
one way to extend cognitive appraisal in general, and the 
OCC model, in particular, into a mechanism for choosing 
between alternative decisions and courses of action. We 
do that mathematically by trying each of the 22 OCC 
emotions in a principled way to one of the “Big 5” 
personality factors and by using that in a utility calculation 
equation. Thus, any event, agent action, or object 
precipitates a utility based on emotional intensity and on 
personality weights. These utilities in turn are what 
determine decision options in the classical game-theoretic 
approach. 
 
Reducing emotion and personality to utility calculation 
may be elegant, and it may even be a computational 
advance for the agent field, however, that does not 
alleviate us from a number of validity concerns. We have 
raised some of these concerns earlier such as the validity 
of the OCC model (and its choice of 22 emotions), 
ignoring nuances and subtleties of emotions and personal 
reaction at the fine-grained level, and the lack of empirical 
support for only 5 factors in the Big 5 model. We have 
also mentioned our assertion that validity concerns are 
partially mitigated by the higher granularity that most 
models address. However, one could more explicitly 
address such concerns via a Monte Carlo simulation 
covering variations one might expect to arise at the fine-
grained levels. We have not attempted such an approach. 
 
The system described here was designed to be integrated 
into a larger agent model.  As such, a number of important 
features are handled crudely, as they are simply 
placeholders for the deeper functionality offered by a 
more complete model.  Probability assessment and 
credit/blame assignment are primary among these. Also, 
we are currently involved in an effort to integrate this 
system as part of a larger agent model into JSAF.   
 
To represent the dynamic nature of active goals and their 
relationship with interest and replenishment goals, it 
would be beneficial to tightly integrate the decision-
making process with a planner, and feed the results back 
into the goal structure.  This will allow not only make the 
model more complete, but may also begin to implement 
the problem-focused coping mechanisms described by 
Lazarus [5].  By not explicitly modeling emotion decay as 
a function of time, our agents will be forced to make 
decisions taking into account not only the emotional 
outcome of their actions, but also whether or not they help 
to solve some pre-existing problem.  If a terrorist runs out 
of gasoline on the drive to his target, he has no choice but 
to first eliminate the associated distress – the potential joy 
of mission accomplishment cannot be attained with no 
way of getting to the target, so every course of action 
aside from finding a gas station will result in nothing but 
persistent distress and likely shame.   
 
In the event that an emotion cannot be eliminated by 
planning a way to make it stop failing, it will be necessary 
to model what Lazarus terms emotion-focused coping, 
which can be modeled by shifting importance values in the 
concern structures so that the effected concern becomes 
insignificant enough to stop causing an emotion.  While 
far from straightforward to implement, this approach 
should yield a powerful method of creating agents whose 
concerns change with experience.  We will thus have 
agents who become demoralized, complacent, obsessed, or 
bored, among other things.   
 
Agents currently have complete knowledge of one 
another’s concern structures.  This is far from realistic, 
and could have dramatic effects if a model of how people 
acquire such information from one another is 
implemented.  This is primarily a recognition problem, 
involving taking raw data about some history of actions 
taken by an agent, their outcome, and what emotional 
reactions were observed, and attempting to assemble this 
into a model of what motivated these actions. 
 
As currently represented, relationships are also static and 
determined in a rather ad hoc fashion.  It may be possible 
to derive these parameters directly from evaluating the 
concerns of one agent against what she believes to be the 
concerns of another.  Goal compatibility likely correlates 
with liking an individual.  Having many goals effected in 
the same way by the exact same events likely contributes 
to a substantial cognitive unit between two parties.  
Familiarity may simply be the extent to which one 
believes his model of another to be complete.  By deriving 
these parameters in this way from the beliefs of agents 
about others, we obtain a dynamically evolving 
relationship. 
 
This framework lends itself naturally towards an 
exploration of implementing the thoughts of Damasio, 
whereby decision-making will be done in not only a more 
naturalistic way, but also using potentially far less 
computation time.   
 
 
Appendix A:  Intensity Equations 
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where sg is a succeeded goal; fg is a failed goal; ss is a 
succeeded standard; fs is a failed standard; sp is a 
succeeded preference; fp is a failed preference;  Rl, Rd, Rc, 
Rf, Ra, and Ro are the liking, disliking, cognitive unit, 
familiarity, agent, and object relationship parameters, 
respectively; P is a function determining the probability of 
the success or failure in question occurring; and S is the 
significance function given previously. 
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